Legislature(2001 - 2002)
02/21/2001 01:07 PM House JUD
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* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
HB 102 - THEFT OF PROPELLED VEHICLES Number 0082 CHAIR ROKEBERG announced the first order of business would be HOUSE BILL NO. 102, "An Act relating to the theft of propelled vehicles." Number 0099 HEATHER M. NOBREGA, Staff to Representative Norman Rokeberg, House Judiciary Standing Committee, Alaska State Legislature, came forward to explain the difference between the proposed committee substitute (CS) [Version J] and the original HB 102. On page 2, line 22, the proposed CS deletes the words "personal water craft" and then goes on to say that "watercraft" does not include "a shallow draft propelled vehicle not more than 12 feet in length with an inboard motor powering a water jet pump as its primary means of propulsion that is designed to carry not more than two persons who sit, stand, or kneel on the vehicle." Number 0181 CHAIR ROKEBERG noted for the record that by "a shallow draft propelled vehicle not more than 12 feet in length with an inboard motor powering a water jet pump as its primary means of propulsion that is designed to carry not more than two persons who sit, stand, or kneel on the vehicle" the committee meant a jet ski or its derivations. Number 0211 MS. NOBREGA explained: We're ... trying to limit the definition of "watercraft" for purposes of this statute only. We don't care about the definition of "watercraft" in any other parts of Title 11, only for this statute, and it's only so that [stealing] a jet ski is not on the same level [as] stealing a boat. If you steal someone's boat, it's an automatic felony; if you steal someone's jet ski, it's a misdemeanor unless you meet the three provisions under section .360(a)(2). MS. NOBREGA said the reason the definition is not included in the back under the general provisions is that the term "personal water craft" is used just once. The rules of construction are that when a term is used just once, it is defined just once, and the definition appears in the section in which the term is used. Number 0350 CHAIR ROKEBERG added that if the term "personal water craft" were to be defined at the back of the chapter, it would be necessary to change the definition of "watercraft" throughout all the chapters, and he thought doing so would make the law more confusing to the general public. He further clarified that the intent of HB 102 is to lower the penalty for the theft of a snow machine, all-terrain vehicle (ATV), or jet ski. Number 0475 ROGER WORTMAN, Staff to Representative Pete Kott, Alaska State Legislature, came forward on behalf of Representative Kott, sponsor of HB 102. He concurred with the proposed CS and with Chair Rokeberg's analysis. Mr. Wortman said HB 102 "creates a level playing field for those people who have to rely on a snow machine or an ATV as a primary means of transportation. It amends the definition of ATV and it puts the personal water craft in a place away from other recognized watercraft." Number 0540 REPRESENTATIVE OGAN expressed confusion about the motivation for putting personal water craft in a different category from other boats. He noted that personal watercraft are expensive machines and may be worth more than an old skiff. Number 0582 MR. WORTMAN said he could not provide an answer. He explained that Jerry Luckhaupt, Legislative Counsel, had helped with the drafting. CHAIR ROKEBERG asked him, "What's the level playing field?' MR. WORTMAN said "personal water craft" was a term Mr. Luckhaupt suggested using in place of "jet ski." REPRESENTATIVE OGAN wanted to know if it would be a felony to steal a personal water craft. CHAIR ROKEBERG explained that a jet ski/personal water craft is put on the same level with a snow machine and an ATV. Under HB 102, it is not a felony to steal any of those, but a second- degree theft, a class A misdemeanor. This removes a burden from law enforcement by separating short-term "joyriding" of one of these "toys" from the more serious vehicle theft, a class C felony. Number 0837 REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL asked for the rationale behind specifying seven days. MR. WORTMAN explained that the seven-day time limit quantifies a difference between joyriding and theft. A person who has kept stolen property seven days is presumed to intend never to return it. REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL wondered why it specifies seven days instead of three. MR. WORTMAN said it was based on the fee for rental so the court system could have some way to place a value on taking a snow machine. Number 0900 CHAIR ROKEBERG clarified that only a propelled vehicle is subject to the seven-day test. REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL remembered when a bicycle he owned was stolen and said, "They weren't even going to start looking for it for a week." He was afraid that police would not even bother looking for a missing snow machine, he said. He thought HB 102 was sending the wrong message about theft. "It concerns me that we're saying we are elevating it, but we're going to give a grace period of a week," he added. Number 0990 CHAIR ROKEBERG acknowledged that the seven-day time limit was somewhat arbitrary, but up to a week's use of property is comparable to its leasehold value; after that, the unauthorized use turns into a crime. "I think the key issue here is the distinction between what's a felony and what's a misdemeanor, and they're trying to make it level in terms of the category of vehicle," he said. REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL referred to page 1, line 12, where there is reference to cases in which there is damage of $500 or more. He surmised that meant police would act immediately rather than waiting a week if a vehicle was destroyed on the day it was stolen. CHAIR ROKEBERG said that was correct. Number 1063 REPRESENTATIVE OGAN observed that if somebody took a "junker" snow machine worth less than $500 and kept it more than seven days, that becomes a felony. MR. WORTMAN said that would be true if that snow machine was the sole transportation of the person from whom it was taken and the thief did not intend to return it to the owner. REPRESENTATIVE OGAN said he didn't see any reference to "sole transportation." MR. WORTMAN said there was no reference to it in HB 102. REPRESENTATIVE OGAN expressed concern about a teenager taking an old, broken-down snow machine, and that being a felony. Number 1178 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ explained that "propelled vehicle" means that the vehicle currently is self-propelled, not that it used to be. CHAIR ROKEBERG pointed out that without HB 102, that theft still would be a felony. "We're trying to lighten up and not make it tougher," he said. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ clarified that taking a junker car is a felony, but taking a junker snow machine is not. Number 1240 REPRESENTATIVE MEYER asked what a new snow machine costs. MR. WORTMAN said a new snow machine costs between $5,000 and $7,500. The rental rate would be about $50 an hour, $150 for six hours, or at least $750 for a week. REPRESENTATIVE MEYER thought it seemed "a little strict" for a 16-year-old's theft of a snow machine to be considered a felony. MR. WORTMAN observed, "I think the qualifiers are here." If a 16-year-old takes somebody's snow machine and is intent on depriving the owner of the machine permanently, then that is a felony. If he takes it and it is returned, that is probably not a problem. If the snow machine is only worth $500 and he wrecks it, it's $500 damage. REPRESENTATIVE MEYER added that if the youth keeps it more than seven days, then it's a felony. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ focused attention on the phrase, "deprived of the use". If the owner was out of town the whole time an unauthorized person was using his snow machine, he said it is arguable that the owner was not deprived of its use. Number 1380 CHAIR ROKEBERG said he thought it came down to whether the owner was "constructively" deprived of the use. REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said, "You have to look at this in the light that's harshest to the state and the light that's most favorable to an accused. That certainly would be a defense that I think any reasonable defense attorney would raise." Number 1416 JERRY LUCKHAUPT, Attorney, Legislative Legal Counsel, Legislative Legal and Research Services, Legislative Affairs Agency, Alaska State Legislature, said he thought if the owner were out of town and unaware that the vehicle was taken, it would be a reasonable interpretation that the owner was not deprived of the use. If the owner had someone staying at the home who noticed that the vehicle was gone, the owner would be deprived of the use, since he/she could otherwise have loaned it to someone. Number 1480 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ further argued that HB 102 only specifies that the owner is being deprived of the use, not that the houseguest is being deprived of the use. MR. LUCKHAUPT said the owner has the right to the use of the vehicle in any way he wants, including loaning it to someone. It is a technical term as to when a person is deprived or not deprived. If a person takes a snow machine while the owner is away, brings it back and fills it up with gas, and the owner wasn't aware that it was gone, then the owner hasn't been deprived of its use; having taken it is a misdemeanor, vehicle theft in the second degree. The felony offense would not apply in that circumstance. MR. LUCKHAUPT then responded to Chair Rokeberg's request to speak to the question of the seven-day limit. He explained that seven days seemed like a reasonable approximation based on normal rental rates. To a certain extent, seven days is an arbitrary figure. Number 1645 REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL observed that in a rural area where a snow machine or four-wheeler might be a person's main transportation, taking it for less than seven days could endanger life. He thought that endangerment had more to do with "a real criminal issue" than did the cost of a rental. CHAIR ROKEBERG pointed out that any activity such as that described is criminal. The point is whether it is a felony or a class A misdemeanor. MR. LUCKHAUPT further explained that the time component is designed to address Representative Kott's concern for those owners who do not choose to go out and rent another vehicle during the time theirs is gone or who get the vehicle back with less than $500 damage. The goal was to provide another component for those persons who lose their vehicle for a period of time. It is an attempt to reclassify some of the cases that now are misdemeanors by saying that taking a person's snow machine for seven days is a substantial loss, great enough to be classified as a felony. Commenting on HB 102, he said, "We aren't taking cases away from current felonies ..., we are taking cases from misdemeanors and making them felonies. If a person is out working a trap line and someone takes his snow machine, other criminal charges would apply. It might be considered murder or attempted murder, assault, or reckless endangerment. Number 1843 REPRESENTATIVE OGAN said he thought he understood that the sponsor's intent was to give people who depend on [an alternative] vehicle for their primary transportation the same status as those who depend on vehicles they drive on the road system. If a person lives in rural Alaska and gets around by four-wheeler or snow machine and that vehicle has been stolen, that rises to the level of a car being stolen in urban Alaska. "As a matter of fact, they used to hang horse thieves," he noted. He suggested that language about "primary transportation" might be included in HB 102. He asked if that was what the bill sponsor intended and if so, should that language be included? MR. WORTMAN said the intent of HB 102 is, as the sponsor statement says, to level the playing field for owners of ATVs and snow machines. An individual had brought this up four years ago, and this bill "doesn't fix all, but it is a good solution to the current situation right now," he said. Number 1843 REPRESENTATIVE OGAN said he was still trying to get to the intent of the legislation. "Somebody's toy that sits in their yard isn't as important as somebody's primary source of transportation if they aren't on a road system," he said. Was that the intent?" CHAIR ROKEBERG said he didn't think the sponsor was "interested in making a Bush exemption; there's no need ... to make that distinction." Number 1970 REPRESENTATIVE OGAN said he did not think taking a snow machine rises to the level of felonious behavior if the machine is "just somebody's toy that [the thief] keeps for a week." He said he thought taking it might rise to that level if the vehicle is something the owner truly needs and depends upon for a livelihood. Number 1990 MR. LUCKHAUPT said he understood that to be the sponsor's intent, and had drafted HB 102 to put snow machines, ATVs, and jet skis on the same level [with one another], and not necessarily to put snow machines on the same level with cars and trucks. The current laws still put snow machines and ATVs on a lower level than jet skis, he explained. Jet skis now are included in the broad definition of watercraft. Other committees that have considered HB 102 have been concerned that it not put snow machines and ATVs on the same level with cars and trucks. MR. LUCKHAUPT continued, saying, "We could try to craft something that deals with vehicles that are used away from the road system. But potentially, an ATV or a snow machine, regardless of whether it is a the person's primary mode of transportation, may be very valuable to the person." He cited the example of someone 40 miles out in horrible weather working a trap line. He said he thought it would be difficult to draw the line, and that drawing it based on the vehicle being the person's primary mode of transportation might not be the appropriate way. Number 2103 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said he tended not to like "bright lines" in the criminal code. He suggested it would be better left to the jury to decide whether seven days is too long or too short a time. He proposed that it might be better to refer to being "deprived of the [vehicle's] use for a protracted period of time." "Protracted" is a term on which there are some court interpretations, and also is an issue on which both sides could argue. It would depend on the circumstances of the case. Number 2165 REPRESENTATIVE MEYER said he thought proponents had suggested that HB 102 might reduce court costs, but prosecuting cases as felonies rather than as misdemeanors would be more expensive. TAPE 01-21, SIDE B Number 0001 MR. LUCKHAUPT explained that HB 102 singles out the jet ski cases and makes those misdemeanors instead of felonies. On the other hand, HB 102 creates an additional way to commit the felony offense, by depriving the person of the use of the vehicle for seven days. So some cases are going to drop out of the felony category into the misdemeanor process, and some are going to be added. There could be differences in cost to the state or to a municipality. He mentioned the Municipality of Anchorage, which prosecutes the misdemeanors while the state handles the felony offenses. REPRESENTATIVE MEYER said he was thinking of Anchorage, where the stealing of snow machines is a problem. In Anchorage, a snow machine is not the owner's main means of transportation. But as he understands HB 102, stealing one's neighbor's snow machine and keeping it for seven days or returning it with more than $500 damage would be a felony. MR. LUCKHAUPT said that is correct. The $500 damage is a felony under existing law. But under existing law, the person who chooses not to go out and rent another snow machine while his is missing simply does without. There is no compensation if the owner does not incur those costs, perhaps by borrowing someone else's snow machine to check his trap line. It costs the owner a lot of extra effort. Is that a loss that is comparable to incurring a $500 cost to rent one? That was the attempt here. Number 2063 REPRESENTATIVE MEYER returned to the question of overall cost to the legal system. "So in your mind, it will balance out by lowering one and raising the other," he observed. "But in some ways, it almost sounds like we'll be saving money for the municipalities but maybe adding more cost ... to the state in the sense of more felonies being prosecuted." MR. LUCKHAUPT acknowledged that was a possibility. However, he pointed to testimony on Monday, which was "that everybody thought any additional cost would be negligible because they are already prosecuting most of these cases somehow." For someone who doesn't have a previous conviction, he said the difference in corrections costs is probably not that much different. He said it was hard to quantify. Number 1960 MARK T. MEW, Deputy Chief, Anchorage Police Department, testified by teleconference. In investigating auto thefts, he had always wondered why stealing a $1,000 ring or a lawnmower or a set of golf clubs is a misdemeanor but stealing a $7,000 snow machine or a $5,000 four-wheeler also is a misdemeanor. Police are going to investigate and prosecute these cases anyway. He said he thinks many first-time offenders will plead down to a misdemeanor. He thinks the cleanest way to look at this is to make things over a certain dollar level a felony and under a certain dollar level a misdemeanor, and let it go at that. He said he does not know why something extremely valuable should not be a felony just because it is not transportation. He also noted that $500 meant something different 20 years ago than it does today, and suggested that the dollar amount for a felony needs to be raised so that the theft of "every mountain bike is no longer a felony." Number 1885 REPRESENTATIVE OGAN reported that he had looked up "felony" in Black's Law Dictionary and found that felonious intent is applied to the crime of larceny "where a person knowingly takes and carries away the personal property of another without any claim or pretense of right, with the intent wholly and permanently to deprive the owner of his property." He suggested a statute should be crafted that fits those parameters of case law. MR. LUCKHAUPT pointed out that Representative Ogan had defined what larceny or theft is. He stated: You've got to have this intent to deprive the owner of the property permanently. That's how it existed in common law, and that's sort of what we have retained in our criminal code. Therefore, if someone does steal a car and they take the car in order to chop it up for parts, ... we'll go ahead and charge the person under ... the theft statutes.... But in most cases, we aren't able to prove that he had that intent to deprive the owner permanently, and that's why the states came up with things like "joyriding" or ... "criminal mischief." If you take the car of another without any right and then you drive around in it a while, or you drop it off somewhere, but you aren't intending to keep it permanently, ... that wasn't theft, and that's why prosecutors ran into problems in prosecuting those cases where people were only taking the car for a period of time. People won those cases; criminal defendants won and weren't convicted of theft because they had no intent to deprive the owner permanently. So ... we've created a new crime to deal with the situation where all we can prove is the person intended to take the car, took the car away, and, therefore, the owner suffers some loss, ... whether it's damage to the vehicle or damage to other property or merely by not having access to their vehicle for a period of time. And so we've had to get away from what normally was felt ... was theft or larceny because these cases didn't fit in there. It was difficult to prove and convict anyone of that. Number 1740 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ agreed with Representative Ogan, "It may be an esoteric argument, but ... when you carve out special exceptions for vehicle theft, the next thing you know, you have special exceptions for weapons theft or clothing theft -- one could make a case for all of them." He said he understood that the drafters of HB 102 "went the vehicle theft route" because it hinges on the intent to deprive another of property, but "deprive" is defined in the case of Glidden v. State as appropriating property with intent to withhold it for so extended a period as to result in a loss of the major portion of its beneficial use. One could argue to a jury that when someone takes a car, even for a day, the owner is going to be deprived of his or her beneficial use. "I think the criminal statute should be written as broadly as possible, and theft in this case would cover the intent to deprive that currently is swept up in vehicle theft," he concluded. Number 1671 REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL said he was struggling with the seven days, and wondered about saying something to the effect that the owner is deprived of reasonable control or use; then a jury could decide if the value of the danger or the value of the deprived time was above the $500 limit. He asked if HB 102 could be amended so that the number of days is not specified. It is possible that in one day, the value of the machine could be significant, he added. CHAIR ROKEBERG said he thought that already was addressed in [subparagraph] (B). MR. LUCKHAUPT explained that if a person actually incurs the cost, it is covered in [subparagraph] (B). That is the approach he was taking when he began drafting, letting the prosecution prove what a reasonable replacement value would be. The owner wouldn't have to actually incur the costs if the replacement value was $500. For example, renting a D-9 Cat for a day is going to cost substantially more than $500. If someone takes a D-9 Cat for a few days now, that's only a misdemeanor unless there is $500 worth of damage or the owner incurs $500 in reasonable costs to replace it. What about the person who doesn't expend the cost? That was the approach the drafters were taking, Mr. Luckhaupt said, but Dean Guaneli, Chief Assistant Attorney General, was not enthusiastic about that from a prosecution standpoint because he didn't want to add to the prosecution's burden at trial by having to prove what a reasonable replacement cost would have been. Number 1535 REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL said he appreciated that discussion. If the damage happens after the fact, that is easily proven. But sometimes if one is deprived of the use of something, that is very costly, too, but there is no physical damage done. Sometimes time lost can be very valuable. Sometimes access or control over something creates a liability for the owner. That is why he thought "reasonable use or control" amounting to $500 was appropriate, he explained. That way, the owner could say the vehicle was only gone for a day, but it cost him a contract or 14 fish in his fish wheel. Number 1490 MR. LUCKHAUPT said that was the way he had started: the owner incurred or would have incurred reasonable expenses of at least $500 as a result of the loss of the vehicle. He restated that Mr. Guaneli did not want to add to the burdens on the Department of Law. "It would be easier on them if [in HB 102] we created some defined set of criteria, for example, a period of time that the vehicle was gone," Mr. Luckhaupt added. Number 1438 REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL ventured, "If in (B) it's all addressed, then maybe we don't need (C). But if in (C), we're trying to say that that seven-day period is going to be equivalent to that loss, then we may need to say, 'the control or use of it for that period of time' is ... the same value as (B)." CHAIR ROKEBERG suggested that it is implicit in (C) that the value is based on the length of time, based on a leasehold theory. REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL said he understood that, but he was concerned about the seven-day issue. His point was that having a vehicle missing only one day could be a "big deal." Number 1420 CHAIR ROKEBERG said he wasn't sure he understood Representative Coghill's point because the monetary values would be reflected in the value of whatever vehicle and/or use that was put to. So one would have to go through the $500 ceiling, and with the D-9 Cat, that would be reached immediately. If it's an old junker snowmobile .... REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL asked: If a $5,000 machine is returned undamaged within seven days, how does the owner demonstrate that not having it cost him $500 or more in a lost contract or a loss in picking up fish? Would he have to file a whole separate suit? MR. LUCKHAUPT said for the theft of a vehicle to be aggravated up to a felony, one would actually have to incur the cost, spend $500 to replace the missing vehicle while it was gone. The loss of a contract would not be considered under HB 102. In establishing the time period, the drafters were trying to make it easy for everyone to understand. It isn't a "bright line" in regard to the valuation of what a replacement cost per day might be. Number 1258 REPRESENTATIVE OGAN said he thought one could prove felonious intent with the seven-day rule "because if a person hasn't brought the property back in a week, he probably isn't going to bring it back." Number 1226 DEAN GUANELI, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Legal Services Section-Juneau, Criminal Division, Department of Law, confirmed that Mr. Luckhaupt had accurately characterized the tenor of their discussions and their interests. From a prosecution standpoint, he said it's certainly not attractive to have to prove on a case-by-case basis what the rental value of a certain property was in a certain locale, and it's certainly easier if "we" just pick a number like seven days. MR. GUANELI continued: On the other hand, I certainly understand Representative Coghill's interests and his concerns. If the proposal is to add some language, ... for example, where it says, "the owner incurs reasonable expenses in the amount of $500 or more" or ... [what in civil law is consequential damages] -- in other words, you could have done something. You could have run your trap lines; you could have gotten a contract; you could have done something else. If that's the concept, I don't have any problem with including that as another way of committing this offense. In other words, you have significantly inconvenienced somebody monetarily. We may not be able to prove that in very many cases, but I certainly don't have any objection to including that ... here. I think there is some danger to expanding these provisions too much. It wasn't too many years ago that all joyriding was a misdemeanor, and a lot of people were legitimately upset when they lost the use of their car for a period of time. But I think you have to realize that many of these offenses, perhaps most of them, are committed by kids. Creating a whole long list of offenses where kids are committing felony offenses that get them into juvenile delinquency, juvenile court, that sort of thing, I'm not certain that's necessarily appropriate. On the other hand, things that they do certainly do inconvenience people greatly, and they're legitimately upset, so I think there certainly is a balance.... I understand Representative Coghill's concerns, and I certainly would have no objection to including the notion of consequential damages .... CHAIR ROKEBERG suggested incorporating a change in HB 102 [Version J]: On [page 1,] line 12, after [incurs], to say "or could have incurred" reasonable expenses. Number 1035 REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL said that did not take into account the value of time lost. Number 0990 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said he thought in the most egregious case, in which someone took a car and thereby prevented the owner's going to work for a week, one could reasonably charge a second count of theft. "The difficulty I see with what Representative Coghill suggests is that if you take someone's car without even thinking that the person is not going to be able to get to work, getting to a second offense is a considerable challenge," he said. Number 0895 REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL agreed, adding that he could foresee "running into some real troubles" with the seven-day issue outside the urban environment. Number 0886 REPRESENTATIVE OGAN asked Mr. Guaneli if he concurred that the seven-day time line is a reasonable measure of felonious intent to permanently deprive someone of property. MR. GUANELI explained that the purpose in coming up with seven days was not as a measure of intent to permanently deprive someone. "It had more to do with what we thought would be a reasonable rental rate," he said. In many instances, kids take a snow machine, drive it around, and leave it in a place where it isn't found for seven days. It's not that they intended to permanently take it; it just isn't found for seven days. Number 0737 CHARLES KOPP, Vice President, Alaska Peace Officers Association, testified by teleconference. He echoed previous testimony that there is a hazard in carving out a special exemption for vehicles. Prosecutorial discretion is very important, especially when dealing with youngsters who have no previous record of criminal mischief and with property that is recovered basically undamaged. Also, it would be difficult to explain to a victim why it takes seven days for the theft of a snow machine to be considered a felony when that is not the case when other property [other than a vehicle] is stolen. He said he thinks adding the reference to seven days complicates the law needlessly. Number 0571 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said he thought that raised a problem. It is one of the rules of construction that if someone can be charged for the same conduct under two different classes of crime, then that person has to be charged under the lesser degree of crime, "So going to Theft 2 isn't necessarily an option," he added. Number 0530 MR. GUANELI said: When there are two statutes that cover the precise same conduct, that does present some problems for prosecutors. However, the court will look for any difference between the two statues to interpret them. In the theft statutes, if we are able to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an intent to permanently deprive someone of their property, that's a difference from the vehicle theft statute where that level of proof is not required, and we can choose to go under one or the other, depending on the level of proof we've got. So I don't really think that ... [the issue that Representative Berkowitz raised] is an issue here .... CHAIR ROKEBERG observed that it shouldn't inhibit the law enforcement officers from prosecuting and fining the criminal because the charge could vary depending on the circumstances. Number 0405 MR. GUANELI said he thought that was right. There are a variety of potentially overlapping statutes throughout the theft statutes now, but there usually is some element in a case that strongly suggests which statue is most relevant. Number 0351 REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL made a motion to adopt the proposed committee substitute (CS) for HB 102, version 22-LS0347\J, Luckhaupt, 2/20/01, as a work draft. There being no objection, the proposed CS, Version J, was adopted. Number 0262 REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL offered Conceptual Amendment 1: "On page 1, line 12, after the word "incurs", put "or could have incurred". Number 0234 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ objected. He said he appreciated the idea but thought Conceptual Amendment 1 was vague. Number 0205 REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL responded to the objection, saying, "The rest of the sentence spells out that it would be about $500 value loss, and he thought by rules of interpretation, that would stay within that context." REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ maintained his objection. Number 0159 REPRESENTATIVE OGAN recalled testimony that what could have happened, rather than what did happen, was getting into the civil area of the law. CHAIR ROKEBERG defended the amendment based on the idea that an action could have occurred but did not necessarily have to occur to prove value. CHAIR ROKEBERG declared a brief at-ease in order for the tape to be changed. [Tape 01-21 stopped with approximately one minute left unused.] TAPE 01-22, SIDE A Number 0001 CHAIR ROKEBERG called the meeting of the House Judiciary Standing Committee back to order. A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Meyer, Coghill, and Rokeberg voted for Conceptual Amendment 1. Representatives Berkowitz, Kookesh, and Ogan voted against Conceptual Amendment 1. Therefore, Conceptual Amendment 1 failed by a vote of 3-3. Number 0092 REPRESENTATIVE MEYER again mentioned that $500 did not seem like much money, and offered Conceptual Amendment 2, "that everywhere we see $500 that it be $1,000", specifically on [page 1,] lines 11 and 13. Number 0145 REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ spoke in favor of Conceptual Amendment 2. He pointed out that the Criminal Justice Assessment Commission (CJAC) recommended that the legislature double the dollar amounts that define the levels of property crimes. Conceptual Amendment 2 is consistent with that recommendation, which was based on a review in the recent past. REPRESENTATIVE MEYER added that changing the dollar amount gets to the point that Representative Ogan had raised about somebody stealing a junker car. Under Conceptual Amendment 2, the junker would have a value of at least $1,000. CHAIR OGAN noted that the junker would not be a car, but a kind of propelled vehicle not including a car, truck, motorcycle, motor home, bus, aircraft, or watercraft. MR. WORTMAN, representing the sponsor of HB 102, deferred comment to Mr. Luckhaupt. CHAIR ROKEBERG asked Mr. Guaneli if Mr. Berkowitz's recollection about the (CJAC) recommendation was applicable in this instance. Number 0271 MR. GUANELI said he thought it would be applicable. However, he thought the CJAC recommendation "was to double the felony threshold for theft for all theft offenses, and that would mean regular theft, criminal mischief, vehicle theft, et cetera." He said he thought there was some danger in just increasing the amount for one particular type of theft and leaving the others at $500. He said he feared that the issue that Mr. Berkowitz had raised about "similar conduct with similar consequences" being covered under two separate statutes might apply. "You damage a vehicle in the amount of $750, it's only a misdemeanor, but you damage any other type of property in the amount of $500, and it's a felony criminal mischief," he said. He suggested what was needed was to comprehensively, across the board, increase all of the dollar amounts. MR. LUCKHAUPT said he had nothing he wished to add to the discussion. CHAIR ROKEBERG declared that Conceptual Amendment 2 was before the committee. He said that notwithstanding Mr. Guaneli's comments, he did not object to the amendment. Number 0493 REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL objected, saying he thought the committee should not increase the amount in this one instance, but, as a matter of equity, should make the increase across the board. CHAIR ROKEBERG took exception to Representative Coghill's objection, "because we'd never get any bills out of this committee if we did that." REPRESENTATIVE OGAN asked if the maker of the motion [Conceptual Amendment 2] wished to continue with the motion. REPRESENTATIVE MEYER said he did wish to continue. Number 0602 REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL maintained his objection. A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Berkowitz, Kookesh, Ogan, Meyer, and Rokeberg voted for Conceptual Amendment 2. Representative Coghill voted against Conceptual Amendment 2. Therefore, Conceptual Amendment 2 passed by a vote of 5-1. Number 0650 REPRESENTATIVE OGAN moved to report HB 102, version 22-LS0347\J, Luckhaupt, 2/20/01, as amended, out of committee with individual recommendations and the accompanying fiscal notes. There being no objection, CSHB 102(JUD) was reported from the House Judiciary Standing Committee.
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